

<p>Ask regular members what they want from the police to generate ideas?</p>	<p>What is happening in the community? What are the police doing?</p>
<p>In this job what is the message why do they need change? What parts?</p>	<p>Find out what the community wants from the police.</p>
<p>Conclude the action</p>	<p>What is the message to the police?</p>
<p>Put into service problems from contacts to suggest useful directions</p>	<p>What is the message to the police?</p>
<p>Clarify objectives - PICO statements?</p>	<p>What is the message to the police?</p>
<p>What is the message to the police?</p>	<p>What is the message to the police?</p>

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2. Even though the war has not formally

changed a war over there has been a significant

~~changes~~ changes in national level strategic thinking. These

changes primarily deal with military options or our

nonmilitary posture and a flexible and selective

responses, both nuclear and non-nuclear, to the

entire spectrum of the Communist Threat.

3. Purpose of JSCP is to:

a) Establish national objectives and policies of the

US in terms of military objectives, strategic concepts,

tasks which are in consonance with actual US

military capabilities.

b. Constitute a directive to cover for the

conduct of ops in cold, CW & GW.

c. Create strategy, logistic planning guidelines

see Annex C, I (~~and~~ (C/E), and

4. In CWC

a In order to ensure that military force is applied effectively, maximum authority will be delegated to the commander(s) concerned for the carrying out of ops.

b Unified and specialized commanders will conduct operations; the JCIS will provide strategic guidance and insure the timely organization and support of forces engaged.

c Employment of nuclear weapons in CW will be subject to a greater degree of control than would be the case in GW.

CW Option

16.2. Command, Communications & Information

adopting system to permit controlled, coordinated and informed direction of all forces - combat ops.

32. CW makes Nuclear Policy. The decision to use nuclear weapons will be made by the ~~President~~ ~~is~~ will

affect the intent of the NSCIA. (1) making feasible effort to seek the win at a non-military level, but be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required. (2) Not nuclear aggression

3. The US will, at the time nuclear weapons are authorized for use by the President, provide additional guidance, requiring

33. Nuclear weapons will be employed:

1) If they are used against US and allied forces.

2) If their use is necessary to maintain the tactical integrity of the forces engaged, or

3) If a deliberate political decision is made to

dominate, by decisive use, our will and ability to employ nuclear weapons, if necessary.

(See Compendium of Rules of Engagement)

with appropriate nuclear response. (1) First

consideration of last resort and no suspension unless

until US interests cannot be defended at the non-nuclear level.

4. initiate a nuclear attack against the borders
of the other nation or one of its major allies.

5. US forces should engage Soviet forces in
overseas theaters. (Also) partial implementation, either to
support US clandestine against the same way, or due to imminent
invasion of Poland reinforcements.

Ex. It is recognized that, during the period of
~~anticipation~~, engagements between forces of the US and the
USSR may occur which, in themselves, are not of
such nature as to constitute sufficient cause for
the US to implement GW from. The circumstances, existing
and world climate under which an engagement occurs
would be major factors in determining what our national
response might be. It is not possible to determine in
advance the precise parameters of possible engage-
ment which the US would:

1) initiate, at least tacitly, military objectives, and thereby

2) engage the Soviet in lesser actions locally, presenting
them with alternatives of disengagement; withdrawal

or "no" action.

2. In The Nuclear War

and

2. The US, under condition of general war, will
launch a nuclear strategy attack in accordance
with the SISDP against designated elements of
FSR bloc strengths.

[Why? SISDP: 5th ^{ONSET} out of GWR probably]

will be characterized by the delivery of intensive
nuclear blows by both sides.] [... SISDP During
initial phase.

]

3. Finally, the SISDP is capable of being
converted into reasonably formal, and thus
more easily verifiable, organization which

provides for collective responses to the extent

possible with due consideration to the degree of

the availability of the committed forces.

126 (2) The World's Allies now have an unified
military ~~defining~~ ^{defining} against which all courses of
action must ~~intended~~ ^{be intended} be weighed. This strength
is the source of our greatest potential of action.
in the collective spectrum of war on a world-wide
basis even though we do not match the S-S Bloc in
all respects. Recognizing that success in warfare
is as much a function of such intangible factors as
will, psychological considerations and the like, the
decision making process must not be unduly
influenced by mere ^{types} strategical evaluations.

b (1) (above). It

Planning is 1st task with becomes

1. Our overall military theaterman will do

intended by making it clear in all actions it is our

nuclear power is available for use at any time and that
we know they will use the power as required.

2. GW ops will be conducted on a scale and in a manner

which reflects that the US force will to acquire the

consequences of general war. [See Annex C] Operations

will be conducted in such a manner as to afford us the

maximum opportunity to take the initiative in using our
power, but) random and nonrandom.

3. US operations against the USSR may be conducted at

a scale less than GW in order to:

1) Achieve those US objectives attainable short of
GW.

2) Cause the enemy to consider his course of action

3) Afford an opportunity for the enemy to suspend
military operations

4) Establish the basis for political negotiations

5) Place the US in a better position to implement SALT plans